From Barth's Trinitarian Christology To Moltmann's Trinitarian Pneumatology: A Methodist Perspective

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Karl Barth called for a new paradigm of the Holy Spirit shortly before his death in 1968. He suggested that this task might be done by one of his own students. He confessed that his trinitarian Christology had neglected the Holy Spirit because he wanted to avoid falling into the subjectivism of Pietism and liberalism. As the father of modern theology, Schleiermacher in the early part of the nineteenth century simultaneously represented both Pietism and liberalism because he made experience instead of the Bible the primary basis for establishing the beliefs of Christian faith. Barth perceived that Schleiermacher's methodology was a serious threat to authentic faith because he had subordinated the biblical witness to personal experience. More specifically, modernism (as Barth called it) threatened the Church's self understanding of God as triune.[1] Hence Barth's theology was constructed largely as an antidote to Schleiermacher's liberalism.

It is well known that Barth introduced into contemporary theology the significance of the Trinity as the key to a Christian understanding of God. Barth was aware that the prominence he was giving to the doctrine of the Trinity was "very isolated" in the history of doctrine, but he insisted that it must be the starting point of Christian doctrine because God reveals Himself as triune in the history of salvation.[2]

In his *Church Dogmatics*, Barth rejected his earlier espousal of liberal Protestantism. He protested vigorously against its compromise with secular

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thinking and its watered-down version of biblical faith, especially its negative attitude about the Trinity as if it were an unnecessary appendage to Christian belief. Barth reinstated in a radical way the priority of a supernaturalistic concept of the triune God who has spoken his Word "from above." All human efforts to prove or disprove his reality are ineffective. God alone is the absolute Subject of his own revelation to humanity. Jesus Christ is the absolute focal point of the self-revealing God, and everything in Scripture is a witness—either by anticipation in the Old Testament or by recollection in the New Testament—to Jesus Christ. God as Father and God as Holy Spirit are interpreted in the light of this Christomonism.

One of Barth's last words before his death was to criticize the trinitarian Christology of his *Church Dogmatics* because he had not adequately integrated the doctrine of the Holy Spirit into theology.[3] Barth admitted his own "perplexity" on how this task might be done. He recognized that the subjectivistic concept of experience in Enlightenment rationalism and in Schleiermacher's liberalism was really concerned implicitly with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but Barth recognized that a fear of subjectivism could not serve as an excuse for his failure to develop a theology of the Spirit.[4]

Enlightenment thinkers like Lessing and Kant, and Hegel among the Romantics, were influenced by the trinitarian theology of Joachim of Fiore (a twelfth Century Cistercian abbot) who proclaimed that the "age of the Spirit" had now come.[5] Hence Barth had good reason for saying that the rationalists with their philosophy of subjectivity were expressing the same concern implicit in a doctrine of the Holy Spirit. This perception that there is a link between the subjectivity of modern philosophy and the subjectivity implied in a doctrine of the Holy Spirit is reinforced when one recalls the Pietistic influence in the Enlightenment thinkers. Pietism developed a compelling theology of feeling over against the sterile doctrinal thinking of Protestant Orthodoxy. Its focus was upon the sanctification of the inner life through the Holy Spirit. This theological subjectivity inadvertently brought down Protestant Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century and opened the door to Enlightenment thought in the German universities. Protestant Orthodoxy had been strongly in place in the universities of Germany in the seventeenth century and acted as a fortress against Enlightenment rationalism. But Pietism so stressed the subjective, individualistic dimension of truth and downplayed the importance of objective intellectual precision that it weakened the doctrinal stronghold of Protestant Orthodoxy and formed part of the vanguard of Enlightenment thinking.[6] Protestant Orthodoxy never recovered its equilibrium. Consequently, Enlightenment rationalism overthrew Protestant Orthodoxy as the dominant intellectual force in German universities.

The Enlightenment concept of rationality and the Pietistic concept of the immediacy of the Spirit are like two sides of the same coin because they appeal to the autonomous nature of thought and feeling respectively.[7] It can be argued that modern subjectivity is a secularized version of "the age of the Spirit" envisioned by Joachim of Fiore in the twelfth century[8] and further catapulted to significance

in the doctrine of the sanctification of the Spirit among the Pietists. Kant was reared in a Pietist home, in addition to being influenced by Joachim's concept of the "Age of the Spirit." He considered his critical philosophy to be an enlightened version of Pietism.[9] This is not to say that the subjectivism of the modern world can only be accounted for in terms of Joachim's concept of "the Age of the Spirit," or the subjectivism of Pietism, but it is to recognize that these were strong winds blowing, along with other theological movements which stressed "the inner light" of the Spirit.

Hegel, however, specifically said that the rise of modern thought and its emphasis on subjectivity and self-consciousness was a direct and explicit translation of the doctrine of the Spirit into secular terms.[10] He rejected what he called the rationalism and intellectualism of Enlightenment thought because it negated the actual personal experience of the Spirit in history. He rejected Pietism (especially Schleiermacher) because it restricted a knowledge of God to religious feelings. Hegel believed the significance of modern philosophy, as it had developed in his own dialectical system, was that the truth of the Christian religion had now become fully developed as a self-consciousness of the Spirit. Hence, for Hegel the modern concept of subjectivity was the fullest expression of the Christian faith, especially Lutheranism.[11]

To this extent, Barth is a "modern theologian" in spite of the fact that he attacked theological modernism—because his starting point was an exclusively subjectivistic focus on the self-authenticating Word of God. Ironically, Barth attacked the subjectivism of modernism with his own neo-orthodox form of subjectivism. For his categories, which he used to theologize his biblical exegesis, were borrowed largely from the philosophy of subjectivity developed by Hegel and incorporated into theology by Richard Rothe and I. A. Dorner.[12] What is especially significant is that Barth's concept of revelation as the moment of the self-revelation of God himself comes from Hegel's concept of Spirit.[13] Indeed it is appropriate to call Barth a "modern theologian" (as Moltmann does).[14]

Since Barth suggested that the modern concept of subjectivity is a secularized version of the subjectivity implied in a doctrine of the Holy Spirit, it is understandable that he would follow up his call for the development of a new paradigm of the Holy Spirit with an energetic warning not to fall back into the trap of equating pneumatology with anthropology![15] This subjectivizing tendency is what Barth means by his "perplexity" over the doctrine of the Holy Spirit—namely how to avoid the built-in tendency of any doctrine of the Spirit to be subjectivistic.

MOLTMANN'S MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL OF EXPERIENCE

The one student of Barth who has responded to his call for a new paradigm is the now-famous Tübingen theologian, Jürgen Moltmann, whose doctrine of the Holy Spirit is largely free of the subjectivism which plagued Barth. Moltmann's pneumatology is centered in an historical understanding of theology, unlike Barth's trinitarian Christology which was authoritarian—based in a concept of revelation "from above" without any rational or affective basis other than mere

faith in God's self-disclosure. Barth's autocratic concept of revelation created the sense that theology, after all, was an irrational affair and that God was nothing more than a projection of our human ego, as Feuerbach had so persuasively charged. But with Moltmann, the revelation of God is not a private affair, subjectively imagined to happen in a non-historical moment of self-disclosure. Rather, the revelation of God is a real historical happening in the concrete world and can be affirmed with rational integrity.

The title of one of his recent books, *History and The Triune God*, says it well! Moltmann shows throughout his writings that he believes the history of salvation is rationally and existentially defensible, personally transforming, and socially revolutionary. Without this historical/objective perspective, any doctrine of the Holy Spirit would easily bog down in the quagmire of subjectivism. Hence it would have been difficult for Barth to have developed a new paradigm of the Holy Spirit, since his trinitarian Christology was already heavily enmeshed within a subjectivism which he had ironically fought so hard and so long against. Moltmann's *Theology of Hope* (1964) pointed the way out of the entanglements of subjectivism by critiquing positivism—which had become the working assumption of modern historical criticism. He also exposed existentialism and neo-orthodoxy as inadequate solutions.

Moltmann has sought to reinstate the role of personal experience as a basis for doing theology without succumbing to the liberalism of Schleiermacher and the subjectivistic tendencies of Pietism.[16] Moltmann's focus is that through the Third Person of the Trinity believers enjoy a shared and personal experience with God. Moltmann writes: "By experience of the Spirit I mean an awareness of God in, with and beneath the experience of life, which gives us assurance of God's fellowship, friendship, and love."[17] This experience of the Spirit includes the remembrance of Christ and the expectation of God's future. Hence, pneumatology presupposes christology and prepares the way for eschatology.[18]

Ever since the rise of modern philosophy and the development of modern science, the concept of experience has been restricted to denote the way facts can be controlled and interpreted clearly and distinctly through rational reflection. Truth claims are always the result of one's own empirical experience. To paraphrase Kant, we create reality by our own active thinking because there is nothing we know through experience which is not first put there by our creative minds.[19] This reduction of all truth and reality to the active determinations of the human mind is the hallmark of modern scientific methodology. With the elimination of any passive elements entering into our consideration of what is real, the experimental method elevates the concepts of domination, self-consciousness, and rational demonstrability. This modern rationalistic concept of experience means the rejection of the primal dimensions of experience and the consequent "desolate erosion of life."[20] And, quite obviously, a personal experience of God is impossible, as Kant maintained.

Moltmann attacks this one-sided modern definition of experience as inadequate on the grounds that self-experience is not nearly so absolute as modern

thought would have us believe. An analysis of the social pattern of inter-subjectivity demonstrates that the consciousness of the self is mediated to us through other selves as well. It is not entirely self-constituted. Likewise, Moltmann points out that social experience is not in itself totally self-constituted; rather, there is a relationship which exists between human beings and their world. More specifically, we as human beings have a body within the larger framework of nature which provide the basis for our primal and tacit experiences of ourselves and our understanding of our world which the modern concept of experience ignores.[21]

Moltmann proposes a multidimensional concept of experience. He does not reject modern scientific methodology, of course, but he rather calls for broadening this base to allow for potential experiences beyond consciousness and self-determination. This larger meaning of experience, while incorporating the element of critical analysis, assumes a fundamental attitude of trust about our capacity to experience reality. The one-sided hermeneutic of doubt and skepticism assumed in the modern concept of experience is destructive of human community and diminishes the personal meaning of human life. The knowledge of God is a meaningful concept only if human experience is truly open to a dimension of reality beyond its own self-determination.

This is not to suggest that human experience has a natural capacity for grasping the reality of God, but rather to point out the passive capacity of human experience to receive what lies beyond itself. This means that transcendence is not to be limited to self-transcendence as modern thought assumes. Rather, we experience God as transcendent in, with, and beneath each experience of the larger world. But even so, we not only experience God, but God experiences us! The point here is that unless we can talk about God objectively in terms of his own experience, then any talk about our experience of God evaporates into sheer subjectivism. Moltmann makes the further point that only if we understand the world as existing within the life of God can we once again talk about those special experiences of God in the history of salvation which form the basis of the Christian narrative.[22]

Moltmann is a true student of Barth because he took seriously Barth's warning not to turn pneumatology into anthropology. This can be seen in the way Moltmann emphasized the distinctive personhood of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is not an extension of the human spirit. The Holy Spirit is not just a point of union between God the Father and God the Son. The Holy Spirit is not just the Father and Son working together and relating together as a "we." Rather, the Holy Spirit is as distinctive in his personal specificity as the Father and Son.[23] This personal specificity of the Holy Spirit has not received adequate theological recognition in modern and contemporary theology—until Moltmann brought it to center stage.

THE TRIUNITY OF GOD

Moltmann's contributions to trinitarian theology are enormous. He has probed in depth the trinitarian doctrine as it has been developed throughout Church his-

tory—including Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and Protestant thought. His work in pneumatology is no less insightful and impressive than Barth's work in christology. To be sure, Moltmann's style of scholarship is not intended to reflect an abstract, critical, and systematic theology, but rather he more modestly calls his books "contributions to theology." His principal motivation is to bring a pastoral orientation to serious theologizing.

Moltmann has not hesitated to challenge the respected positions of the best thinkers in the Christian tradition—for the sake of getting at a more exegetically-based theological understanding. He has laid bare the fundamental issues surrounding the meaning of the Trinity with absolute clarity and perspicuity. His writings have been a significant reason for a resurgence of interest in the doctrine of the Trinity in recent years. For example, Wolfhart Pannenberg's recent *Systematic Theology* is an impressive development of these trinitarian issues as they were first raised in Moltmann's *Crucified God* (1972) and *Trinity and the Kingdom* (1980). After Pannenberg's three volumes of systematic theology, trinitarian thinking will never be the same. Moltmann is to be thanked for his significant contribution in developing a new paradigm of pneumatology.

What is perhaps surprising is that, as a Reformed scholar, Moltmann turns to an appropriation of Eastern Orthodox theology as a basis for developing a more comprehensive understanding of the Trinity. Those of us in the Methodist tradition are naturally predisposed to this direction in Moltmann's thinking. John Wesley was highly influenced by the early Greek theologians, such as the Cappaodican brothers and Marcarius the Egyptian.[24] Of course, Wesley was a High Anglican clergyman, and conservative Anglicanism was typically more in line with the Greek Fathers of the church in reference to the work of the Holy Spirit and the doctrine of sanctification than it was with the Western tradition which focused largely on the doctrine of justification (though not to the exclusion of sanctification). Hence Methodism and its offshoots, such as Pentecostalism, have always had a larger appreciation for the immediacy and vitality of the Holy Spirit in the believer's life than its Protestant counterparts. This also explains in part why American Methodist Evangelicals have not meshed too well with their Reformed and Lutheran counterparts who have always been quite suspicious of our doctrine of holiness and our message of the Spirit-filled life. Typical is the accusation that we are turning the grace of God into works righteousness because we believe in the impartation of the righteousness of Christ to the believer through the infilling of the Holy Spirit.

Wesley was, of course, influenced by Pietism in his earlier days, but almost 200 years before Barth, Wesley had come to distrust Pietism and mysticism for reasons similar to Barth's. Its subjectivism displaced the priority of Scripture. Wesley complained that religious subjectivism allowed for everyone to be their own bible. Wesley's quadrilateral—the Bible, tradition, reason, and experience—intended to protect faith from succumbing to sheer subjectivity. Scripture has the first place; for the doctrines of Christian faith must be established by an exposition of Scripture, whereas experience subjectively confirms these objective doctrines.

Wesley said that if experience failed to confirm a teaching of Scripture then he would be convinced that he had misunderstood the Scripture, yet experience in itself cannot establish a doctrine.[25] Here it is apparent that there is huge difference between the role of experience in the theology of Schleiermacher and Wesley.

Though Moltmann does not use Wesleyan and Pentecostal categories, as such, he has forged his way right into the heart of these issues and declares that Western Christianity has developed largely a defective soteriology because it has a defective pneumatology. The root cause of this problem is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of God. Ever since the development of the concept of the Trinity in the Western tradition, beginning with Tertullian's coining of the word *trinitas* and Augustine's more systematic development of *una substantia, tres personae*, the unity of God has usurped the role which rightly belongs to the three Persons of the Godhead. Consequently, Western Christianity has implicitly been monarchical in its view of God; it has focused more on the Father of the Son, giving rise more to a duality than a trinity. And the Holy Spirit has, for all practical purposes, taken on the role of a force or power than a distinct Person.[26]

Moltmann believes that this monarchical tendency was exacerbated further by the "unofficial" introduction of the so-called *filioque* clause into the Nicene Creed in the West which finally led to the schism between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church in 1054. The Nicene Creed affirmed that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father, but the Western Church added that the Holy Spirit proceeded from Father *and* Son. Eastern theologians argued that this downgraded the distinct personhood of the Holy Spirit by subordinating the Holy Spirit to the Son, as if the Spirit is a mere power or effect of Christ. To say that the Son is the origin of the Spirit thus confused the trinitarian relationship and made the Holy Spirit less than divine in comparison with the Son. To say that the Son is also the origin of the Spirit unintentionally turns the Son into a second Father.[27] The Father alone is the source of all reality; the Son is the mediator of reality; and the Holy Spirit is the agent of God in reality. So the Father creates through his Son by the power of the Holy Spirit. In terms of *constitution*, Moltmann insists that the Father is the eternal origin of the Son and the Spirit. So Moltmann acknowledges the "monarchy" of the Father in the eternal sense of the constitution of the trinitarian Persons, but in terms of the actual movement of the divine Persons they are totally equal without any degree of subordination. Moltmann calls this movement "the circulation of the divine life."[28]

Beginning with the Cappadocian Fathers, the trinitarian relationships were defined in terms of reciprocity and mutual interpenetration. In the eighth century, John of Damascus gave a summary of the Eastern Church's position on the Trinity in terms of *perichoresis*.[29] The Father exists in the Son, the Son in the Father, and both of them in the Spirit, just as the Spirit exists in both the Father and the Son. The trinitarian Persons possess their own unique characteristics which distinguish them from each other and, at the same time, their personal differences bind them together in love and mutual reciprocity. Intimacy, friendship is the defining quality of their oneness and unity. The threeness of God is what deter-

mines the oneness of God, and the oneness of God is defined in terms of God's threeness.

This "circulation" of the divine Persons in not a tritheism. For God is not composed of three separate, independent beings who come together at some later time in order to form a fellowship. Nor is this a modalism. For the three Persons are not three modes of being without eternal personal differentiations. Rather, it is the eternal "circulation" of the divine Persons in perfect love for each other and in fellowship with each other which constitutes their experience of eternal life. This inner-trinitarian relationship is what constitutes their oneness. This stands over and against Augustine's model of God as one substance, three persons.

Moltmann argues in favor of the Eastern Church's understanding because the Western idea of divine substance minimizes the personal differences which exist among the three Persons of the Trinity. Likewise, Moltmann rejects the modalism of Barth, who defines God as Absolute Subject with three eternal modes of being. What constitutes the unity of God is not substance or modes of being, but the relational, perichoretic indwelling of the three Persons. This divine process is what constitutes their fellowship and perfects them in a unity of love. In this way, the pitfall of subordinationism is eliminated, and a monarchical model is avoided. The significance of Moltmann's work in pneumatology is that he takes this perichoretic model and deepens its meaning and application for our contemporary world. He shows that we must think of the trinitarian Persons as equals; each possesses will and understanding; each speaks to each other; each turns to each other in love and communion.[30]

How is this perichoretic unity of the Trinity to be arrived at theologically? Moltmann's answer is that through salvation history we come to see that God has revealed himself in this fashion. What this history of salvation reveals is that God is not a distant Monarch who stands over against the world and above the world in a dominating and threatening way. Rather, what is perceived through the history which God has with Israel and finally in Jesus of Nazareth is a God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This triune God is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ through the power of the Holy Spirit. God is Father, not only because he is the source of all reality, but because he is the Father of Jesus Christ. It is his relationship with his Son which bestows upon him his sense of Fatherhood. Likewise, the Son's relationship to the Father is what bestows upon him his sense of sonship. And it is through the power of the Holy Spirit which enables the Father and the Son to be so related and at the same time for the Father and Son to be in the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit to be in the Father and Son. The point of creation, reconciliation, and glorification is that men and women and all of creation might become a part of the "circulation" of the triune God.[31]

THE MODERN CONCEPT OF *PERSON*

The concept of *person* emerged as a result of the Church's attempt to define how Jesus could be called God and man at the same time in the fourth and fifth centuries A. D. Gerhard von Rad has pointed out that the biblical concept of God

who reveals himself in history as personal is the original source of the modern concept. "Here alone, in his encounter with God, does mankind become great and interesting, breaking through the enigma of his humanity to discover all the inherent potentialities of his self-conscious existence."[32] The late neo-Marxist atheist and Czech philosopher, Vitezslav Gardavsky (a personal friend of Moltmann), has also shown that the Old Testament revelation of God to Abraham as a self-conscious, transcendent being who stands outside of nature is the original source for the emergence of the concept of *person* in the modern world.[33]

The Greek word for person (*prosopon*) meant "mask"—such as those worn by actors in the ancient Greek theater as they confronted the audience representing a particular character. The word literally meant "face, visage, countenance." It had strictly an objective meaning without any reference to subjective self-consciousness or permanent duration.

In Latin theology, the term *person* was first used in reference to Sabellian modalism—one God with three masks or roles (*prosopon*). In Greek theology, the Greek term *hypostasis* (a parallel term to *prosopon*) was used in developing the doctrine of the Trinity. The term *hypostasis* did not carry the meaning of mask or mere appearance, but was used to denote the individual existence of a particular nature. Whereas *hypostasis* was eventually the word Greek theology chose for the Trinity, the Latin term *persona* was developed in Western theology and was deepened in its meaning to describe one's particular, unique, individual, permanent existence.[34] By the sixth century, the philosopher Boethius formulated the definitive, classical definition of personhood: "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature."[35] In other words, a *person* is one who possesses unique individual existence with intelligence and thus is non-interchangeable with others.[36]

Using Boethius' definition of personhood, Moltmann shows that the three Persons of the Trinity are not mere modes of being. They are not simply three masks which God wears in his revelation to humanity. They are not mere roles or expressions of the one God. Rather, the three Persons of the Trinity "are individual, unique, non-interchangeable subjects of the one, common divine substance, with consciousness and will. Each of the Persons possesses the divine nature in a non-interchangeable way; each presents it in his own way."[37] Accordingly, there is both the divine nature which the three Persons have in common, and there are also the natures which the three Persons uniquely possess for themselves.

The particular nature of each divine Person is shaped by their relationship to one another. For the decisive characteristic of each Person is not simply an abstract oneness which binds them together; rather, what gives each Person their own unique nature as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is the relationship which they share together in their common bond. Being a *person* thus involves more than just being a unique individual possessing rationality, but it also includes the social element of being in relationship with others.[38]

Moltmann shows that "relations" and "substantial individuality" are essential ingredients for understanding the Trinity today. Unfortunately, the Western understanding of Trinity defined "person" largely in terms of "relation," as if a

person is relation. But God as Father means more than just God is related as Father. It means that the Father has concrete existence as a person with being, not just a mode of being. The Father has his fatherhood by relation to the Son, but this relation is not the concrete existence of the Father, but rather this relationship presupposes his actual, distinct existence. Person and relation are not the same in their meaning; for to be a person presupposes relations, and relations presuppose persons. To restrict the meaning of "persons" to "relations" is modalistic because it eliminates the enduring, concrete, subjective existence of the person. We have Augustine largely to thank for introducing the concept of relation into the meaning of personhood. But even so, his explanation for describing the Holy Spirit as the relational unity of the Father and Son implies that the Holy Spirit has no genuine personal identity of his own. This implies that the Holy Spirit is more like an impersonal force than a real person who is intimately related to the Father and Son as an equal partner. The need to recognize the distinct person of the Holy Spirit as an equal partner in the triunity of God is why the Eastern Church preferred the use of *hypostasis* in stead of *proposopon*.[39] Unless "relation" also includes "substantial individuality," then the Holy Spirit is not really thought of as a divine subject along with the Father and Son.[40]

On the other hand, Moltmann finds the Orthodox tradition to be weak because it only assumes that the relations "manifest" the three Persons, as if the relations are not essential aspects of the distinctive nature of the three Persons. Moltmann argues that the "relations" of the three Persons must be taken seriously in the sense that they are mutually and reciprocally bonded together in fellowship and love. Personality and relationships are inextricably connected.[41]

This mutual reciprocity and interdependence of the triune God is the social model for understanding the meaning of the whole of human life and creation. In this personal model for God as Trinity, Moltmann finds the basis for social reconstruction and change in the world. Hence his concern for human liberation, ecological concerns, and the many troublesome aspects of social life. Particularly he finds consolation and hope in spite of the experience of widespread suffering in the world today because the God of Jesus is revealed as one who suffers with us. Without God's capacity for pathos and emotional involvement with his creation, God would not be the God of hope. And only in trinitarian thinking does it makes sense to talk about the love of God and his emotional capacity to feel with us.

In the Enlightenment period, the subjective concept of autonomy led to a focus on the absolute, substantial idea of personhood as in Kant's concept of the transcendental ego. But even the concept of autonomy as used by Kant did not mean the sheer irrelevance of feeling nor the idea of mere individualism. For the autonomy of reason meant for Kant that a mature individual is one who is properly in touch with one's own potentiality and inner resources for living responsibly in the world. Autonomy meant having the courage to think for oneself as opposed to living in an immature relationship of dependency upon others. For Kant the concept of autonomy clearly included a sense of moral responsibility to treat others with dignity and respect. This relational aspect shows that Kant did not have

in mind an individualistic experience of arbitrariness when he spoke of the autonomous individual.[42]

With Fichte and Hegel, God came to be defined as Absolute Subject as opposed to Augustine's concept of God as Substance. Karl Barth picked up this Hegelian concept of God as Absolute Subject to define the nature of God's oneness, and he consequently substituted "modes of being" for the trinitarian Persons.[43] Barth's concern was that the meaning of person carries with it today the absolute concept of sheer autonomous individuality and self-consciousness without reference to being-in-relationship with other persons.[44] Thus, Barth thinks that the modern concept of personality is radically different from the pre-modern world.[45] Hence Barth called for a new way of framing the doctrine of the Trinity which would not be in conflict with the meaning of personhood as it is used today.

Barth thus featured the oneness of God, who in a threefold manner, repeats himself in the mode of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God's oneness is defined as a Person with self-consciousness which is reflected from within itself as a threefold "divine repetition."[46] In fact, Barth's fear of tritheism is so great that he studiously avoids any possibility of ascribing personality to the trinitarian distinctions. For Barth, any idea of individual conscious existence given to the three distinctions within God "is scarcely possible without tritheism."[47]

Is Barth right that the term *person* can no longer be used in reference to the trinitarian distinctions because the modern usage is allegedly different? And is it true that only in the modern period has the concept of self-consciousness been applied to the concept of personhood?[48] Moltmann disputes the claim that the word *person* has undergone such a radical change in meaning in the modern period. He also disputes the claim that self-consciousness is a modern addition to its meaning.[49]

Moltmann surely seems right in his assessment over against Barth. While it is true that Augustine's concept of the relational concept of person did minimize the element of substantial individuality (*hypostasis*) and hence his tendency toward modalism, yet Boethius's definition of personhood as a *rational* individual carried with it the twin ideas of individual existence and self-consciousness.

It is surprising that Barth thinks Boethius's concept of rationality omitted the concept of self-consciousness. For Boethius explicitly used the concept of reason as it had been developed in Greek philosophy. If the concept of divine transcendence in the Old Testament was an important first step for the emergence of the concept of personhood as generally recognized in philosophy and psychology, then the concept of the uniqueness of human life in terms of rationality as first given in Socrates was another "first step." As the Platonic scholar A. E. Taylor has shown, no previous thinker had ever defined the human "soul" as "rational." Rather, the concept of the soul (as, for example, in the ancient Pythagorians) assumed that the soul was the vital aspect of life, but it was not linked, as such, to the concept of reason.[50] With Socrates, the decisive characteristic of human life is reason. And the whole point of the Platonic dialogues is to engage in a deliberate, self-conscious attempt to develop an ethical perspective on life—"the unexam-

ined life is not worth living," as Socrates says in the *Apology*. Critical, reflective thinking is thus an essential ingredient of human life.

In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle defines God as a self-knowing mind without the slightest awareness of anything else external to himself because of his total self-sufficiency. This means God is totally focused on an awareness of himself. To know what is outside of himself would be a deficiency because it would involve being conditioned by something other than himself. Hence, God's rationality is his capacity to be absolutely independent and totally self-conscious of himself alone. And the philosopher is likewise one who rises above the limitations of the world through his own self-knowing mind and enjoys the contemplation of divine truth. Hence, for Aristotle, the defining characteristic of human life is one's capacity for a rational comprehension of one's true self. Hence, self-consciousness is an obvious implication of reason in Greek thought.

It is remarkably misleading for Barth to say that the element of self-consciousness first entered into the meaning of personhood in the modern world. For Boethius's concept of reason was largely borrowed from the Greek notion of reason and applied to the term *person*. Since the term *person* originally lacked the element of subjective, vital existence, this is obviously in part why it never occurred to Socrates to equate reason with the concept of *person*. Yet the concept of reason was directly related to the idea of the soul seeking to establish a consciousness of itself ("Know thyself," is a Socratic maxim). Surely this knowledge of oneself is related to the meaning of self-consciousness as understood in the modern world, and it is this idea of reason which Boethius linked to the concept of *person*. If rationality as the unique feature of human life does not involve the concept of self-consciousness in Greek philosophy, then the whole history of Western philosophy will have to be rewritten!

Barth admits that Boethius's definition of personhood is the presupposition for understanding the way the trinitarian persons are understood in the pre-modern world.[51] If so, then the relevance of defining the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as persons is all the more compelling *today*! For surely to even talk about the distinctions among the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit implies that each distinction presupposes a consciousness that one is distinct from the other. To be sure, the elements of rationality and individual existence as the core meanings of person are given further refinement and deepened understanding in the modern and contemporary literature on personhood. And there is no doubt that the concept of self-consciousness has assumed greater importance for the modern concept of person than in the pre-modern world. But to represent the pre-modern view of person as totally lacking the concept of self-consciousness is surely an exaggeration.

Barth also believes the modern concept of individuality is too absolute to be used in reference to the Trinity without falling into tritheism.[52] What Barth describes as individuality is actually the cultural attitude of individualism rampant in the Western world. To be sure, individualism is a serious threat to the Western world, especially in America. In *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (1985), five social scientists documented the radical individualism of

the American way of life and showed—through interviewing people across the country—that it is smothering our society and leaving Americans with a feeling of meaninglessness. The end result of individualism is personal estrangement and social isolation due to a lack of commitment to the ideals of family life and religious community. These social scientists see a revitalization of the American way of life only through the restoration of mutuality and community. They link individualism primarily to the acquisitive attitude of success and the pursuit of wealth.[53] Yet this need to be affluent is so emotionally draining and stressful that it is a major reason why Americans are flocking into counseling rooms across the country in record numbers in order to discover ways of restoring their sense of personhood.[54] Instead of individualism being identified with the modern concept of personhood, it is actually suffocating us emotionally and depriving us of our sense of being a person. That is why our society is so panic-driven. That is why self-help books in psychology are flooding the book market.

Barth is right that any definition of personhood today assumes the element of self-consciousness; but individualism, as such, has not been widely held as part of the meaning of personhood in the modern and contemporary world, even though it is certainly a cultural manifestation and offshoot of modern subjectivity. And if a sheer isolated ego without relationships were the essential implication of this concept, then we would certainly have to reject the terminological use of *person* in reference to God at all! For then neither the oneness nor the threeness of God could be called "Person." Such a concept of individualism is totally inappropriate as a characterization of God without falling into an Islamicization of the understanding of the God of Jesus.

It is true that Descartes, as the founder of modern philosophy, and Kant, as the highpoint of Enlightenment philosophy, focused heavily upon human subjectivity (the autonomous "I"). Their formal concept of *person* took on the semblance of being egocentric and individualistic. Consequently, Kant blatantly defined God as a Person who is an absolutely autonomous "I" in contrast to the longstanding Christian tradition which had defined God as three Persons. He specifically says the doctrine of the Trinity "hurts" our religious capacity to even believe in God.[55] Paul Tillich points out that Kant is the first one in the history of Christian thought to be directly responsible for calling God a Person.[56]

Kant's absolute concept of person ("the transcendental ego") was placed alongside his moral/relational concept of *person* in his ethical and religious philosophy. In his *Religion with the Limits of Reason Alone*, he explicitly defines "personality" as having two components: rationality and moral accountability.[57] Kant says the moral law which requires us to treat others as valuable in themselves is not a predisposition to personality. Rather, "it is personality itself."[58] To be sure, the moral law (the idea of a humanity well-pleasing to God) is a formal concept, but it rightly stresses that the very core of the meaning of personhood is our capacity to enter into relationships with others and behave toward them according to the Golden Rule. This ethical/religious aspect of personhood is an important modification of his purely theoretical/absolute concept of personhood as self-consciousness.

In spite of the radical emergence of modern subjectivity and its stress on self-consciousness, the relational aspect of personhood was never left behind. This can be seen in Hegel, who provides for a deeper and more enriched understanding of personhood which includes both the concepts of self-conscious individuality and relationship. Hegel writes: "Personhood is the infinite subjectivity of self-certainty; it is reflection into self through distinction, which is...exclusively vis-a-vis others." He further writes: "Personhood is what is based upon freedom—the first, deepest, innermost freedom....'I am a person, I exist for myself'—this is an utterly unyielding position....Each person is a rigid, unyielding, autonomous being-for-self." Hegel acknowledges that this is an abstract and thus incomplete definition until it is given a moral meaning as well. "Ethical life, love, just means the giving up of particularity, of particular personhood, and its extension to universality—so too with friendship. Inasmuch as I act rightly towards another person, I regard him as identical with myself. In friendship and love I give up my abstract personhood and thereby win it back as concrete. The truth of personhood is found precisely in winning it back through this absorption, this being absorbed into the other."[59] Here Hegel clearly set the stage for the modern and contemporary understanding of the meaning of personhood. Any definition of personhood which omits the subjective "I" or which omits the objective "other" is inadequate.

The larger significance of Hegel's concept of *person* is his development of a historical understanding of reality (which was in part indebted to the trinitarian thinking of Joachim).[60] Unlike anyone previously, Hegel developed a comprehensive concept of history which has been as decisive for the modern world as his concept of *person.* What is generally recognized is that the modern concept of history has its original source in the Hebraic experience of the history of salvation in which God revealed his personal nature. Hegel (who is considered to be the the most formative influence in the rise of the modern historical consciousness)[61] intentionally developed his concept of history as a philosophical extension of the biblical experience of God's personal disclosure of himself in the world. For Hegel, history is the growing awareness of human potentiality into a fully developed self-consciousness. This human potential is made possible, Hegel says, by an internalization of God's will, that is of God himself.[62] Hegel thus shows that a sense of history and personhood are inextricably interwoven with the concept of God's self-revelation. In this regard, Moltmann has shown that Hegel's development of a historical understanding of personhood is an expansion of both the substantialist concept of *person* in Boethius and the relational concept of *person* in Augustine.[63]

It is certainly to be recognized that a "deconversion" process away from a religious orientation was initiated with the rise of subjectivity in the modern world, and this shift has surely led our Western world towards the development of a secular, post-communal culture. What is also clear is that this modern concept of subjectivity is a secularization of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, especially of the Holy Spirit. We have already noticed the religious, and especially Pietistic, roots of this development. We noticed that Kant's philosophy of religion was a philosophical translation of his earlier Pietism. We also noticed that Hegel intended his phi-

losophy of subjectivity to be a secular restatement of his Lutheran theology. What is also decisive about Hegel's philosophy is that his historical understanding of reality provided an alternative to the classical substantialist interpretation of reality derived from Aristotle. The concept of substance assumed that the core of reality was permanent and unchanging. This notion was incompatible with the biblical view of reality as historical. For world history is the realm of change. Substantialist thinking objectifies reality and allows one to comprehend it rationally through abstract categories. Historical thinking subjectifies reality and allows one to experience it personally. Of course, historical thinking includes objective thinking and substantialist categories, but the focus is on the personal sense of meaning derived through the events of history. This shift away from a substantialist to a historical way of thinking is rooted in the biblical notion of the Holy Spirit who encompasses the world and allows us to participate in God who discloses himself in the happenings of history. The "deconversion" process of modern subjectivity is thus an implicit pneumatology. It is largely a demythologizing of the Trinity, as Hegel's philosophical exposition of the Trinity demonstrates.

No one has done more to popularize and promote this deconversion process than Freud. This can be seen in his psychoanalytic concept of persons which assumed that "positive communities" are formed by guilt and are repressive and inhibitive, whereas "negative communities" exist for the sake of the individual establishing a more meaningful relationship with oneself.[64]

The subsequent development of the psychoanalytic theory of persons sought to correct the one-sided, instinctual, and materialistic assumptions of Freud, especially Karl Jung, Karen Horney, and Erich Fromm, who have clinically demonstrated the relational roots of anxiety disorders and the importance of healthy relationships in the formation of a mature personality.[65] Erich Fromm in particular decried the emotionally-shallow consumerism and narcissism of our individualistic culture.[66]

The psychoanalytic methodology of the brilliant British psychiatrist, Frank Lake, emphasized the parent/child relationship in the formation of a well-integrated personality. His model of the "I-My-Self" is a well-differentiated person, a mature personality, in whom there is the presence of the ego ("I") in the self. The "My" is the spiritual synthesis of the "I" (derived from father) and the "self" (derived from mother). Without this well-differentiated sense of personhood, the "I-my-self" evaporates into a confused "IMYSELF." The concrete existence of one's personal existence is thus formed largely through parent/child relationships. The "I" represents father's guiding voice of authority and law; the "self" represents the face of mother's love and a feeling of well-being; the "My" represents our own spiritual synthesis of the "I" and the "self." Hence, a mature person is one who experiences the presence of the ego in the self. Frank Lake has especially shown the trinitarian source of this relational understanding of persons which is foundational in psychoanalytic theory.[67] He shows that a repersonalization can occur for those who have experienced the loss of self through sacramental and evangelical means of grace which reestablish a sense of love through our incorporation into the life of the Trinity.

The goal of establishing a sense of self-conscious well-being is certainly a dominant meaning of personhood in the modern world. But does this focus on intentionality and self-consciousness render the concept of personhood useless as a term for speaking of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit? Are not the trinitarian Persons conscious of themselves as Father, as Son, and as Holy Spirit? If so, that makes them self-conscious beings with will, feeling, and understanding. On the other hand, if the oneness of God constitutes the divine self-consciousness, then the trinitarian distinctions are mere attributes and modes of being, which means that the doctrine of the Trinity is only an appendage to our understanding of God and thus not vital to our theological understanding and spiritual life. Moltmann is so right and so insightful to call attention to the centrality of the divine Persons for a genuine Christian theological understanding of the one God. With prophetic zeal, he argues for a trinitarian conception of God as the basis for resolving the personal, social, and ecological problems in the world today. For the way out of a repressive cultural individualism and its social irresponsibility is a return to trinitarian thinking.

TRINITARIANISM AS A PANENTHEISM

Some suggest that Moltmann identifies God with the natural process.[68] This is erroneous. No one writing in the area of theology has developed more clearly the nature of God as Creator *ex nihilo*. Quite literally for Moltmann, God spoke the temporal world into being through his Word in the power of the Spirit. God in no way is to be identified ontologically with the world in a pantheistic sense. But neither is God's relationship to be defined in terms of deism, as if God stands above the world in another realm separate from this realm. Moltmann defines God's transcendence in terms of the future.[69] He stands ahead of us and is certainly different in his very essence from the world.

Moltmann's use of "panentheism" is only a terminological substitution for monotheism. Wolfhart Pannenberg does not agree with Moltmann's decision not to use the term monotheism, but he defends Moltmann against the misunderstanding of his critics who accuse him of abandoning the historic Christian view of God. Pannenberg in particular defends Moltmann against the charge of tritheism.[70] Both Moltmann and Pannenberg are in essential agreement concerning the new focus and deepened understanding of the significance of the Holy Spirit.

Moltmann's choice of the term panentheism[71] is related to his concern to show that God is the source of all reality, the agent in all reality, and the power active in all reality. This is why he decides against the term monotheism; it fails to convey the dynamic involvement of God in his Creation and it specifically obscures the trinitarian nature of God's essence. Some who apparently have only given a cursory reading of Moltmann's writings think that his "panentheism" identifies God's essence with the world. I once mentioned to Moltmann that some of his American critics accuse him of being a humanist or possibly a pantheist, to which he replied with an expression of utter surprise and disbelief.

Roger Olsen and Stanley Grenz reflect this misunderstanding of Moltmann's

view of God's relationship to the world.[72] They even think that Moltmann denies God's eternal triune existence because Moltmann says that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity. They fail to see that Moltmann is only taking seriously the revelation of God in history and that what God is in himself is revealed in history and what the Son of God experiences in our history also is incorporated into God's experience of himself. Only the Son of God, for example, suffered on the cross (Moltmann is not a patripassionist!), but his sufferings were experienced by the Father as the loss of his Son. In other words, Jesus' death was felt by the Father who loves his Son and who enters affectionately into the life of the Son through the Spirit. Moltmann frankly recognizes that his statement that the immanent Trinity is also the economic Trinity is open to misunderstanding "because it then sounds like the dissolution of the one in the other," which he certainly avoids doing; but he clearly explains his meaning that there is no divorce between God and history. What God is in his historical revelation is what he is in himself! History reflects his true nature.

Olsen even questions whether Moltmann is an "Evangelical ally" because of "hints of panentheism."[73] If any theologian has ever consistently maintained God's divine otherness from the created order, it is Moltmann! He explicitly rejects the Process Theology of Schubert Ogden and John Cobb with their identification of God with the world and its rejection of a traditional doctrine of the Trinity based on revelation.[74] Moltmann's critique of Paul Tillich's "panentheism" strikes at the root concern of Olsen. Moltmann rejects Tillich's inclusion of God's essence within the created world.[75] Moltmann clearly affirms God's involvement with the world, but it is an involvement based on God's decision of love. It is not an ontologically pantheistic involvement![76] Moltmann is no more pantheistically inclined than Peter, who speaks of our being made "partakers of divine nature" (2 Pet. 1:4) or Paul who speaks of everything existing in Christ (Col. 1:17). Moltmann clearly distinguishes between an emphasis on the nearness of God to his creation and a pantheistic identification of God with the world.[77] Moltmann rejects Whitehead's identification of God with "a unified, world process" because this means "God is turned into the comprehensive ordering factor in the flux of happening."[78] Over against all other forms of panentheism, Moltmann insists on "the fundamental distinction between creation and Creator."[79] Over against the one-sided "monotheistic" divorce between God and the world, Moltmann insists on a trinitarian view of Creation.[80] The panentheism of Cobb, Ogden, and Whitehead result in a "divinization of the world,"[81] whereas traditional "monotheism" is monarchical in tendency, and its extreme de-divinization of the world has resulted in a godless view of nature. Trinitarian theology preserves God's essential distinction from the world, while at the same time the world God has created exists in him.[82] Moltmann's theology of creation *ex nihilo* is clearly expressed in his own words: "The World was created neither out of pre-existent matter, nor out of the divine Being itself. It was called into existence by the free will of God."[83] Moltmann shows that the free will of God does not mean arbitrariness, but rather God's freedom is rooted in God's love.[84] Hence the divine love of the trinitarian Persons is the panentheistic basis for a theology of Creation.

The choice of the term panentheism is based on its ability to express the close proximity of the Creator with his Creation—"everything is in God and God is in everything." The term monotheism is disadvantaged by its inability to be so comprehensive in its designation of God's relationship to the world. There is not the slightest trace of pantheism to be found in Moltmann's panentheism. Barth has shown that the safest protection against atheism and pantheism is the doctrine of the Trinity.[85] Surely Moltmann's unequivocal affirmation of the Trinity, along with the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, leaves no room for misunderstanding his theology as a pantheism or humanism!

THE HISTORY OF GOD

Some critics have suggested that Moltmann reduces God to the finite historical process. This is a misconstrual of Moltmann's concept of history. For Moltmann and Pannenberg (who incidentally are good friends and whose theological concerns overlap considerably) history is redefined and enlarged in its meaning from the positivistic view of history which has dominated contemporary thought. History is not simply the realm of the finite, as if God stands above history and his revelation has to be inserted vertically from above. Rather, reality is history! This is so because history is the sphere of the personal, and the history of salvation reveals that the ultimate reality of God himself is personal. Hence it is appropriate to speak of the history of humanity, but it is also appropriate to speak of the history of God. God is not a lifeless, static, Monarch devoid of movement and relationship. Rather, God is one Essence with three distinct, interrelated Subjects who possess will, feeling, and understanding. These three *hypostases* are beings-in-relationship. Their reality is historical because of their personal involvement in the life of each other. Their trinitarian history is not a finite process. It does include the concept of process in terms of the divine *procession* of the Spirit from the Father of the Son. The mistake of American Process Theology is that it does not make the theological distinction between the eternal procession of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the temporal, natural processes of nature and finite time. When critics of Moltmann realize this enlarged and more biblically derived meaning of history, then their objections to his speaking of the history of God will be alleviated. Interestingly enough, Moltmann defends Joachim of Fiore against the heretical charge that he reduced the Trinity to world history.[86]

This historical understanding of reality has its origin in Hegel's philosophy of history. Just as Aristotle defined reality as substance, so Hegel defined the comprehensive whole of reality as history. Just as substance for Aristotle was not a category among other categories of reality but was reality itself, so history is not a category of reality among other categories but is reality itself. Hegel's historical interpretation of reality corresponds to the biblical emphasis that the decisive meaning of revelation is the personal disclosure of God in history. History is the sphere of the personal and, hence, the very essence of reality itself. To be sure, Hegel's philosophy of history and his articulation of the nature of God seemed to get lost in his use of dialectical abstractions. Nevertheless, his highlighting the nature of reality

as historical constitutes his greatest contribution. Any theology which is going to address the contemporary mind today in a persuasive manner can hardly avoid acknowledging the rise of the modern historical consciousness. Moltmann and Pannenberg are such influential thinkers in the contemporary world largely because of their effectiveness in presenting a historical understanding of reality in contrast to the nonhistorical, substantialist thinking of classical thought derived from Aristotle. To be sure, the category of substance is not simply dropped out of their vocabulary, but it is rather reconceptualized in historical terms.

This understanding of history as reality also explains why history does not come to an end in the eschaton. Time as we know it will come to a sudden halt at the coming of Christ in the eschaton. Then the kingdoms of this world will be delivered to the Father by the Son. And then time will cease and eternity will begin for redeemed humanity and the whole of creation in its past, present, and future as it is embraced by the kingdom of God. But reality as history does not come to an end.[87] This meaning of history is larger than a positivistic view which assumes that history is merely a record of finite happenings, just as the concepts of process and becoming have a larger meaning than is assumed in American Process thought. Eberhard Jüngel in his interpretation of Barth's view of the Trinity, shows that God's being is in his becoming, that the concept of becoming does not necessarily imply finite development; rather, it implies life and movement.[88] Likewise the concept of process does not necessarily imply finite change as the classical doctrine of the procession of the Trinity illustrates. So also, the concept of history as reality does not imply finitude, but most fundamentally implies that reality is an engagement of persons in relationship with each other. Thus history as reality will never cease, even though world history and time will come to an end in the eschaton.

Moltmann emphasizes that this coming of Christ is something that is a real happening in time; unlike some theologians who want to demythologize the advent of Christ or reinterpret it in a supratemporal/nonhistorical manner, Moltmann preserves the biblical focus on a real, temporal eschatological happening. He writes: "But if Christ's parousia is equated with God's eternity, then there is no moment at which it can enter time. There is then no future end of time—nothing but the limitation of all the times of human history through God's eternal moment. But this puts an end to all the real and futurist expectation of the parousia which echoes in the early Christian 'maranatha—come soon!', and transforms eschatology into mysticism."[89] Moltmann criticizes Barth because he interprets the advent of Christ as if it were only the final presentation of the salvation perfected in Christ's death on the cross. But if the real future time of Christ's coming "can do no more than disclose the perfect tense of salvation," Moltmann argues that "the New Testament's futurist assertions about salvation are meaningless."[90]

No theologian in recent times has had a stronger emphasis on the real, temporal, future happening of the coming of Christ to bring about the end of time and the beginning of eternity for Creation than Moltmann. Moltmann seeks to protect the understanding of the Parousia of Christ from being interpreted either as merely temporalized or merely eternalized. He complains that the "Christian

expectation of the parousia was also stifled by the theologians who declared that the so-called delay of the parousia was a fictitious problem which had nothing to do with true faith, since faith experiences and expects God's grace every moment."[91] This minimizing of the future expectation of the coming of Christ due to the supposed embarrassment of Christ's delay was the price the Church paid for its integration into the Roman Empire which had the effect of turning Christianity into a civil religion.[92] Moltmann notes that the development of an eschatologically oriented theology in recent years has helped the Church once again to restore the Parousia of Christ to its rightful position within the framework of Christian faith.[93]

The main reason why Moltmann has been able to speak more biblically, forthrightly, and convincingly about the transcendent realities of the Parousia, heaven, the Trinity, the bodily resurrection of Jesus from the dead, his deity, and the personal ministry of the Holy Spirit in human life and in Creation is because he has taken seriously the modern historicization of reality.[94] The extreme supranaturalistic ontology of Barth, which radicalized God's being above the world in a dualistic fashion, leaves one with the feeling that Christian belief is dogmatically handed down from God above in an irrationalist and authoritarian manner. To be sure, Barth's theology presupposed a real (as opposed to a demythologized) history of salvation, but his dualistic view of God and the world worked against his evangelical exegesis and actually moved in the direction of thinking of this world in secularistic terms. It is significant that the "Death of God" theologians of the 1960s were largely Barth's students who specifically said that their secular interpretation of the gospel was "initiated with Barth."[95] Other students of Barth, such as Moltmann and Pannenberg, embraced his biblically-based theology and its focus on the history of salvation while rejecting his dualistic, supranaturalistic bifurcation of God and the world. Moltmann's *Theology of Hope* addressed the same concern of secularism reflected in the "Death of God" theologians who had taken seriously Barth's idea of God's absence and total otherness from the world. The main difference between Moltmann and the secular theologians was that Moltmann appropriated Barth's style of evangelical exegesis of Scripture and his corresponding theology of salvation history, but Moltmann developed a trinitarian view of history which preserved God's transcendence *for* the world instead of a dualism of God "over against" the world. In this way, Moltmann was able to take the central theological distinctives of Barth and develop them in a more consistent fashion—both logically and biblically. Hence, Moltmann's trinitarian pneumatology is fundamentally a theological refinement and further development of Barth's trinitarian Christology.

Barth's irrationalist understanding of faith cannot but create a skeptical feeling that faith really does not have a basis beyond its own imagination, after all. His dualistic image of God occupying the space above the world as a divine Monarch makes it impossible to affirm the history of salvation in the Bible in which God is intimately related to his people as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. As opposed to the deistic tendencies of a supranaturalistic ontology, Moltmann's trinitarian history of salvation

and his eschatologically oriented theology, with its focus on the immediacy of God's Holy Spirit in the world today, have contributed to a revitalization of the biblical understanding of God. This understanding serves as the basis for bringing about social change, ecological responsibility, and personal transformation in the lives of human beings starving spiritually, emotionally and physically from deprivation, abuse, domination, and discrimination. Only as human beings are brought into a saving relationship with the Father of Jesus Christ through the fellowship of the Holy Spirit is there salvation for individuals as well as the world as a whole. Moltmann's focus on the social implications of a trinitarian doctrine of God, and a corresponding belief that a relationship with God commits the believer to take an attitude of moral responsibility for the whole of creation, is a fitting reminder to the Christian community that we really do not take seriously the gospel if we try to privatize the meaning of faith in some sort of mystical retreat from the world.

John Wesley certainly modeled this integration of the social and personal dimensions of faith. No one in the eighteenth century was more proactive in addressing social ills and the disintegration of human life than Wesley. Today, however, the social and personal problems of our world are greater than ever, and yet never has there been a time when the technical and scientific resources have been greater for resolving (as well as aggravating) global problems, if only the way of Jesus Christ were taken seriously and followed by his own disciples! Moltmann's focus on the historical interpretation of faith is helping us to better understand in a fresh and vital way just what it means to believe in Jesus Christ.

This of course does not mean that Moltmann is an infallible guide. He must be read critically, as he would insist himself. For there are perspectives which he holds which Evangelicals believe to be untenable, such as his view of the Virgin Birth of Christ. Pannenberg also raises other issues which need to be addressed, such as whether the distinction between the divine "constitution" and divine "circulation" can be used to minimize the concept of the monarchy of the Father. Pannenberg insists on the unity of the trinitarian persons as grounded in the monarchy of the Father. This issue represents a sharp difference between Pannenberg and Moltmann.[96] What also has to be addressed in this debate between Pannenberg and Moltmann is the practical issue that the term *monarch* has a negative connotation for many Christian lay people because it implies a tyrannical notion of domination rather than a loving father who desires the affection of his children. Yet, the "monarchy" of the Father which Moltmann allows to be a part of the divine constitution cannot be bypassed. At any rate, the eschatological and historical orientation of Moltmann's theology is certainly expressive of the essence of the biblical revelation and represents a creative new direction for thinking more biblically about the Holy Spirit.

THE PERSONAL INDWELLING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

Moltmann points out that others have sought to respond to Barth's call for a new paradigm of the Holy Spirit, but theirs has largely been a restatement of the traditional concept of the Spirit which, in the Protestant Orthodox tradition,

delays the experience of the Spirit until the future eschaton. As such, the concept of a personal experience of the Spirit is simply bypassed in favor of an equation of the Spirit with the Word, and this connection of the Word with the Spirit is largely a formal one.[97] For all practical purposes, the Protestant Orthodox tradition and its various neo-orthodox adaptations have only a doctrine of the Father and the Son—a binity instead of a trinity. The Spirit is largely eschatologically postponed and unavailable for present experience. Another way of defining this eschatological postponement of the Spirit is to equate it with the doctrine of the imputation of righteousness. That is, the holiness of Christ is not actually imparted to us through the indwelling of the Spirit, but is imputed to us—a kind of fictional righteousness which is not really ours, but we are only looked upon by God as if it really is ours.

Typical of a Reformed view of the Holy Spirit is the British scholar, James Dunn, who published his work, *The Baptism in the Holy Spirit* (1970), two years after Barth's initial summons for a new paradigm of the Holy Spirit. Instead of coming up with a new paradigm, Dunn only defended the traditional Reformed view of the "Spirit and the Word" by attacking Wesleyan, Pentecostal, and the sacramental views of Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.[98] Each of these theological perspectives hold to a view that the baptism with the Spirit (Pentecost) is primarily an event subsequent to conversion-initiation (Easter). Dunn criticized Barth for his exegesis which lends support to the idea that there is a theological difference and time-lapse between baptism with water and baptism with the Spirit.[99]

Barth had shown exegetically that baptism with water and baptism with the Spirit were two distinguishable events with a distinct meaning of their own. Baptism with water symbolized the beginning of the Christian life in regeneration and was the sacrament of Easter, whereas baptism with the Spirit (Pentecost) symbolized the perfection and sanctification of the Christian life. In this respect, Barth had exegetically and theologically shown that Pentecost was the confirmation of Easter, even as the baptism with the Spirit was the goal of baptism with water. Barth further showed that each instance of being filled with the Spirit in the Book of Acts (Acts 8:15; 10:45; 18:25; 19:2) was an ongoing experience for those who were already believers and indicated the continuing work of sanctification in the life of believers. In this respect, Barth distinguished Easter and Pentecost as the two decisive events of salvation history which alone are determinative for the formation of the Christian life.[100] Just as these two events are separate in time and yet related through time, so in the life of the believer does one experience his/her own Easter and Pentecost. One begins his/her Christian walk through one's personal participation in the event of Easter (Jesus' resurrected life), symbolized through baptism with water, and subsequently the believer is to experience the ongoing fellowship of the Holy Spirit given at Pentecost.[101] Despite Barth's extreme imputation theory and postponement of righteousness until the eschaton,[102] he also emphasized the ongoing experiential realization of the Spirit's fullness, in contrast to typical Reformed theology.

Dunn largely directed his exegesis against the Wesleyan and Pentecostal traditions which assumed that one's personal spiritual pilgrimage involves an infilling of the Spirit subsequent to their conversion-initiation experience. Dunn allows that only for the disciples was there a lapse of time between their conversion-initiation and their fullness of the Spirit. This, he says, was occasioned only because of the temporal development of salvation history and thus was unique to their situation.[103]

Despite the obvious time distinction between the event of the Samaritans' baptism with water and their subsequent reception of the Spirit's fullness (Acts 8) and likewise with the Ephesians (Acts 19)—an exegetical understanding stemming from the early Greek Fathers and assumed in Roman Catholic and Anglican theology—Dunn engages in a forced exegesis in order to collapse the temporal succession of water baptism followed by Spirit baptism into one grand event. And the conversion-initiation event is given an extremely formalistic and imputationist interpretation typical of Reformed theology. To be sure, Dunn undoubtedly allows for the progressive unfolding of divine grace in the life of the believer, but his theology of the Holy Spirit is not directly related to the actualization of sanctifying grace. Rather, the baptism of the Holy Spirit formally happens at the moment of conversion-initiation and is an eschatological event which becomes a reality at the end of time. And his concept of salvation history is static and formalistic, as if the pattern of the progression and unfolding of God's revelation in history is fixed and rigid and is not a pattern for individual believers today.

A more flexible understanding of salvation history would allow that some may have a relationship to God today which may be similar to that of Abraham, Moses, the prophets, the disciples of Jesus before Easter, and some may have a relationship to God similar to the kind of experience typical of the apostles and believers on the day of Pentecost and subsequently. Surely Barth is right to insist that Pentecost marked the perfection of the Christian life and that this experience in some measure is already being made available to believers today because of the indwelling Spirit.[104]

The sacramental theology of Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholic theology define the two stages of the Christian life and baptism (Easter) and confirmation (Pentecost).

The doctrine of confirmation and its connection with Pentecost was pointedly rejected by John Calvin, whose imputation theory of righteousness caused him to oppose (as did Luther) any theory of good works as being vitally related to our acceptance with God. For Calvin, the rite of confirmation as constituting a special anointing of the Holy Spirit which would be attended with the disbursement of righteousness smacked of a meritorious view of holiness.[105] Protestant Orthodoxy in general has never had an adequate view of sanctification because it lacked a proper exegetical and theological understanding of the Holy Spirit as the infusion of sanctifying grace here and now.

The Wesleyan tradition, however, understands the work of sanctification as being decisively the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the believer here and now. This Wesleyan emphasis is an extension of the Anglican rite of confirmation which, as we have seen, interpreted Pentecost as the perfecting of the sanctifying

grace of God begun in conversion (the Easter experience). The significance of John Wesley was to develop a doctrine of holiness which emphasized the evangelical dimensions of sanctifying grace as opposed to the more formal and ritualistic laying on of hands in the sacrament of confirmation. Even as Martin Luther had uncovered the evangelical meaning of the doctrine of justifying faith which had been largely enshrined in the formal sacrament of baptism (Easter), so John Wesley had uncovered the evangelical meaning of sanctifying grace which had largely been enshrined in the rite of confirmation (Pentecost).

In his sermon on "Scriptural Christianity," Wesley says that being filled with the Spirit means the believer possesses the whole fruit of the Spirit—love, joy, peace, etc. It means loving God with all the heart, mind, and soul, and your neighbor as yourself. In his sermon on "Christian Perfection," Wesley says that this experience of sanctifying grace (loving God with all the heart, mind, and soul, and your neighbor as yourself) became available in the truest sense of the word *for the first time* as a result of the giving of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. In this respect, he says that the disciples of Jesus were the first in the history of salvation to be made perfect in God's love.[106]

In *The Spirit of Life*, Moltmann provides a full-length account of Wesley's historic debate with the Moravian leader, Count Zinzendorf. Wesley argued that sanctifying grace is available today because this was the significance of the disciples being filled with the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost. Zinzendorf, in a typical Lutheran way, argued that holiness was imputed in justifying faith and that there was no further receiving of holiness after that initial moment of conversion. Wesley argued against Zinzendorf that the disciples were converted before Pentecost and that as a result of their being filled with the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost they were filled with the perfect love of God.[107]

The Wesleyan tradition took as its distinctive responsibility the task of spreading "scriptural holiness over these lands." John Fletcher was an important influence in this task. John Wesley described himself, his brother Charles, and John Fletcher as "the Exposed triumvirate" of Methodism.[108] John Wesley was the evangelist; Charles Wesley was the hymn writer; John Fletcher was the theologian. As the first systematic theologian of Methodism, Fletcher emphasized the connection between sanctification and Pentecost. He especially stressed the need for every believer to experience their own personal pentecostal baptism with the Holy Spirit. He pointedly showed that John Wesley's evangelical understanding of Christian perfection was nothing more than taking seriously the Anglican ritual of confirmation (the ordinance of Pentecost).[109]

The essence of holiness for Wesley was love, not a moralistic obedience to the Law. The Protestant Orthodox tradition found it difficult to believe that John Wesley taught it was possible to made perfect in love because they thought of perfection in static, moralistic terms rather than in dynamic relationship-oriented categories. This misunderstanding is what created the impasse between Zinzendorf and Wesley. Wesley's theology of sanctification was largely informed on the basis of Christian antiquity and the Anglican tradition with its emphasis

on love rather than performance. A notable influence on Wesley's thinking was Marcarius the Egyptian, whose writings on spirituality linked perfection of love with the baptism with the Holy Spirit.[110] While Wesley did not highlight this connection between sanctification and the infilling of the Holy Spirit, it was certainly implicit in Wesley's thinking and John Fletcher brought it into focus with Wesley's approval.[111]

Another feature of Wesley's emphasis on the perfection of love is its trinitarian pneutomology. The goal of the Christian life, Wesley says, is for the believer to embrace the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in one's innermost being.[112] Only because Wesley already had a highly developed view of the experience of the Holy Spirit could he emphasize the privilege of believers to made perfect in love. And only because he had a view of perfection as a dynamic, relational category in contrast to the static and formal concept of Protestant Orthodoxy could he call believers to this ongoing process of being made perfect in love. And because he did not divorce theology from life, he saw the practical implications of holiness in terms of social responsibility for the poor, the marginalized, and the disinherited.

The primary emphasis on the Holy Spirit in American religious history has been found in those denominations which are an extension of the Anglican tradition with its roots in Greek Orthodox theology rather than in the formalistic/imputation thinking of the Protestant Reformation. I am speaking of the Pentecostal denominations and the Charismatic movement which had their origin in the Wesleyan tradition with its doctrine of the Pentecostal fullness of the Holy Spirit. Of course the Charismatic movements stress the gifts of the Spirit, whereas the Wesleyan movement stresses the fruit of the Spirit. It may be that Reformed scholars have produced more academic studies on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but those denominational groups which are the offshoots of Anglicanism and who stress a personal fullness of the Holy Spirit have opted for a more literal reading of the book of Acts with its obvious distinction between baptism with water and baptism with the Spirit. And they have not only the scholarly backing of Karl Barth's exegesis, but also the long history of Anglican/Catholic tradition extending back to the early Greek theologians and the Cappaodican Fathers in particular. This long-standing tradition is reflected in Karl Rahner's *A New Baptism in the Holy Spirit: Confirmation Today*. Karl Rahner interpreted individual instances of the personalizing of the Holy Spirit among Catholic charismatics today as a releasing of grace to individual believers over whom the Church had already pronounced its blessing of confirmation.

Barth links the Holy Spirit with the fruit of the Spirit and the fullness of the Christian life.[113] His theological exposition of Pentecost (baptism with the Holy Spirit) as a subsequent event to Easter (baptism with water) is certainly a step in the right direction. His exegetical considerations of the Pentecostal passages in the Book of Acts, which he theologically links with the process of sanctifying grace, is in accord with Christian antiquity and is a helpful corrective to the one-sided eschatologically-future orientation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Protestant Orthodoxy. Unfortunately though, Barth's extreme imputation theory

of Easter and Pentecost puts him in the same category as the Anglican/Catholic sacramentalists who objectify grace rather than personalize it as an actual transformation within the believer here and now.

A Wesleyan reading of Moltmann's theology will also appreciate his development of a theology of the threefold kingdom of God derived from Joachim of Fiore but also found in the early Cappodocian Fathers.[114] Moltmann delineates three different stages of God's self-revelation—the Kingdom of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. These three stages of God's revelation are not three different kingdoms but a progressive development of the one Kingdom of God. In the Kingdom of the Father, we surrender to his sovereignty, recognize his lordship over creation, and become his glad servants. In the Kingdom of the Son, we are adopted into God's family and become his children. Outwardly we are still God's servants, but inwardly we share in the intimacy of his family through our joint heirship with Jesus Christ, God's Son. In the Kingdom of the Spirit, our relationship to God takes on further meaning as we become his friends. This third stage of the kingdom means that we have a direct relationship to God; it is now consummated in the truest sense of the term. For God dwells within us through his Spirit. This means that we have true friendship with God at this deepest level. This is why Jesus said to his disciples, "No longer do I call you servants....but I have called you friends" (John 15:15). Jesus promised his disciples this kind of friendship because they would receive the fullness of the Holy Spirit.

Moltmann reminds us that these stages of our relationship to God as servants, as children, and as friends do not mean that each stage can be isolated as if we could be God's servant without being his children or friends. This means we cannot simply date these stages of salvation history in a mere chronological way, though that would certainly seem to be involved as well. What distinguishes these stages is the focus of each one. The focus of the Kingdom of the Father is not the same as those of the Kingdom of the Son and Kingdom of the Spirit. The Kingdom of the Father focuses on our being his servants, but even in this stage we are his children and friends in an embryonic sense. The possibilities implicit in the Kingdoms of the Son and the Spirit were already tacitly available in the Kingdom of the Father. For the Kingdom of the Father established the trend which was unfolded in the Kingdoms of the Son and of the Spirit. This means the Kingdom of the Son embraces the Kingdom of the Father and the Kingdom of the Spirit embraces the Kingdom of the Father and Son. This successive yet inclusive development of each Kingdom embracing each other avoids the modalistic tendency in Joachim's merely chronologically successive explanation.[115]

Paul says that "when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son" to make us his sons as well. "Because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba! Father!' " (Gal. 4:4, 6). Notice the two sendings. He sent his Son into the world to make us his children also; and because we became his children, he sent his Spirit to dwell within us so we would feel true affection for God. The first sending was the coming of the Son of God as a man; the second sending was the coming of the Spirit of God on the day of Pentecost to fill us with

true affection. And yet the sending of the Son and the subsequent sending of the Spirit originates with the Father (Gal. 4:6) who blessed Abraham and promised him the Kingdom (Gal. 3:14).

A Wesleyan appropriation of Moltmann's theology of the threefold development of the Kingdom of God has already been anticipated in our discussion of Barth's distinction between Easter and Pentecost. Just as there was a distinction between the sending of the Son of God and the sending of the Holy Spirit in the history of salvation, so there may be a similar historical development in our personal salvation history. As our Creator and Maker, God is Father; as our Redeemer who adopts us into his family, God is Son; as our Sanctifier who binds us to himself in friendship, God is Spirit. It is possible that we can plot the development of our own individual relationship to God according to God's threefold revelation of himself.

The primary focus of the Old Testament is that God is our Father. In the Gospels God is revealed in his Son. At Pentecost God the Father and God the Son came to dwell within us in the intimacy of genuine friendship through the promise of the Holy Spirit. This is why the church is known as the "fellowship of the Spirit." This level of friendship with God is what Jesus promised would take place when the Holy Spirit came upon them. It is not enough for us as servants to respect God as Lord of the universe; it is no enough for us as children to respect God as the Father of Jesus Christ in whose family we are adopted children. We are faithful servants and obedient children because we are also God's friends.

This means that our relationship to God is motivated by feelings of love, not fear. As God's servants and children, we have a genuine fondness for him. We enjoy his fellowship. John wrote that we know this quality of perfect love for God because "he has given us of his own Spirit" (1 John 4:13). This affectionate quality of love is a distinctive feature of the higher level of friendship with God.

Friendship means more than just respect. It means genuine affection. Servants respect their masters because of their sovereignty. Children respect their parents and are intimate with them because of the natural blood bond between them. But friendship adds a further meaning to our relationship with God—genuine love. Friendship is respect combined with affection. The Holy Spirit indwelling our hearts inspires us with this new affection for God because his love is poured out [Pentecost] in our hearts (Rom. 5:5).

Some know God as the one God and Father of the universe as he revealed himself to Abraham. Many are in the church whose actual experience with God is limited to this basic awareness of him as their Creator. Even though they know about the coming of Jesus Christ, they may not have internalized this deeper revelation of God.

Yet to know God as one's Creator is certainly an important saving experience even if it is just the beginning of our journey with God. John Wesley, in his *Explanatory Notes on the New Testament,* comments that Cornelius knew the God of Abraham before Peter preached Christ to him (Acts 10) and that his prayers were heard even though he had not heard about the coming of Christ.

Throughout the development of salvation history and as God established a deeper relationship with his people, they understood more and more about him.

Some knew him more personally, such as Moses to whom God revealed his name for the first time (Exod. 6:3). Prophets like Isaiah reached a moral understanding of God unique in the history of the world. Of course the fullest revelation of God appears in Jesus Christ, and the highest level of our knowledge of him is experienced through the infilling of his Spirit.

Many in the church have a knowledge of Jesus Christ which is limited to an objective acceptance of him as God's personal embodiment in human life. This is like the experience of the disciples before Pentecost, of whom Jesus said their names were written down in heaven (Luke 10:20). While this awareness of Christ results in saving faith, it is not enough; God's wants to fill us with the Spirit of Christ so that we become fully his, as Jesus had explained to his disciples that this was the intent of Pentecost (John 14:15-18). To be sure, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not disjointed in their triunity. Consequently, this personal application of the larger history of salvation must not be interpreted in a modalistic fashion. For a relationship to the Father involves a relationship with the Son and the Spirit. Yet, an ever deepening of our relationship to the Triune God progressively experienced in one's own personal history of salvation may be similar to the way that God has revealed himself in the biblical history of salvation, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Just as a trinitarian view of history must not be interpreted modalistically, so one's personal history in relationship to God must not be so interpreted.

This trinitarian view of salvation history implicit in Wesley's thinking is made explicit in John Fletcher, who was the closest friend of John Wesley and the first systematic Methodist theologian. Wesley edited and published John Fletcher's writings, and referred to him as one whom "God has raised up" for the specific purpose of making this trinitarian understanding of salvation history so clear.[116] The development of Wesleyan theology and the rise of Pentecostalism are equally indebted to the trinitarian pneumatology of John Fletcher and his systematic interpretation of John Wesley's theology of salvation. Moltmann's trinitarian pneumatology makes a further significant contribution to our Wesleyan understanding. Especially his emphasis on the social application of a trinitarian pneumatology is a needed reminder for Wesleyans to take seriously Wesley's sense of social responsibility as a model for those who profess to be in pursuit of holiness. One may not agree with Wesley's political conservatism or Moltmann's democratic socialism, but one can agree that to take the social concept of God seriously necessarily means that we cannot ignore the social implications of the gospel.

Moltmann's sympathetic interpretation of Wesley's concept of Christian perfection in therapeutic and relational categories, along with his appreciation of the vitality of the spiritual life among Pentecostal denominations which are rooted in the Wesleyan tradition, help to give prominence to theological motifs which are central to our heritage. We can indeed count him as an "Evangelical ally."

Notes

1. Karl Barth, *The Theology of Schleiermacher*, ed. Dietrich Ritschl, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1982), pp. 276-279.
2. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1963), 1:345, 346.
3. Barth, *The Theology of Schleiermacher*, p. 278.
4. Ibid., p. 279.
5. Jürgen Moltmann, *The Spirit of Life*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 2, 203-209.
6. Theodore M. Greene, "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's *Religion*," in Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. xiv. Cf. Schleiermacher's reference to Spinoza's piety as the meaning of being "full of the Holy Spirit" as an illustration of the way that modern subjectivity is a secularization of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit (*On Religion*, trans. John Oman with an introduction by Rudolf Otto [New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958], p. 40).
7. Paul Tillich, *A History of Christian Thought*, ed. Carl Braaten (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 286.
8. Moltmann, *The Spirit of Life*, pp. 295-296.
9. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, p. xxx.
10. G. Hegel, *Reason in History*, trans. Robert S. Hartman (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953), p. 25.
11. Ibid., pp. 23,24.
12. Jürgen Moltmann, *History and the Triune God*, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1992), p. 140.
13. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Introduction," *Revelation as History* (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1968), p. 5.
14. Moltmann, *History and the Triune God*, pp. 140-142.
15. Barth, *Theology of Schleiermacher*, p. 279.
16. Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, pp. 17-31.
17. Ibid., p. 17.
18. Ibid., p. 18.
19. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950), pp. 66-69.
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21. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
22. Ibid., pp. 31ff.
23. Ibid., pp. 58-77.
24. Ted Campbell, *John Wesley and Christian Antiquity* (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 1976), pp. 66-67.
25. Laurence W. Wood, "Wesley's Epistemology," *The Wesleyan Theological Journal* 10(1975):48, 49.
26. Jürgen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom*, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 140.
27. Moltmann, *History and the Triune God*, p. 38.
28. Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 176.
29. Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, p. 59; Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 1:425.
30. Moltmann, *History and the Triune God*, pp. 84-85.
31. Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 178.
32. Gerhard Von Rad, *The Problem of the Hexateuch*, trans. E. Dickens (New York: McGraw

Hill, 1966), p. 153.
33. Vitezslav Gardavsky, *God is Not Yet Dead*, trans. Vivenne Menkes (Baltimore: Penguin, 1973), p. 28.
34. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 1:408-409; Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 171.
35. Cf. Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 2:118 for a discussion of this concept and its subsequent impact on Western thought through Aquinas.
36. Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 171.
37. Ibid.
38. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 1:419; Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 171.
39. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 1:408.
40. Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 168-169.
41. Ibid., pp.172-173.
42. Tillich, *A History of Christian Thought*, p. 321.
43. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 1:407.
44. Ibid., p. 410.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 412.
47. Ibid., p. 411.
48. Ibid., p. 420.
49. Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p.141, 145-146.
50. A. E. Taylor, *Socrates* (New York: Doubleday, 1953), pp. 13ff.
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52. Ibid., p. 411.
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54. Frank Lake, *Clinical Theology* (London: Darton, Longman, Todd, 1966), p. 4.
55. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, p. 138.
56. Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (University of Chicago Press, 1951), 1: 245.
57. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, pp. 21ff.
58. Ibid., p. 23.
59. G. Hegel, *The Christian Religion, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson (Scholars Press), p. 95.
60. Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, pp. 295-296.
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63. Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 174.
64. Cf. Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic. Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York: Harper, 1965) for an extended discussion of the negative implications of Freud's psychoanalytic theory.
65. Cf. Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York: W. W. Norton and Cook, Inc. 1939), pp. 9-10.
66. Erich Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 32-46.
67. Cf. Frank Lake, *Clinical Theology*, pp. 816-818, and throughout this remarkable theological/psychiatric masterpiece.
68. David P. Scaer, "Theology of Hope," in *Tensions in Contemporary Theology*, ed. Stanley N. Gundry and Alan F. Johnson (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), p. 218.

69. Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 92.
70. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 1988), 1:336n.
71. Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, pp. 19, 129-132.
72. Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, *20th Century Theology, God and the World in a Transitional Age* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), pp. 182-183.
73. Roger E. Elson, "Is Moltmann the Evangelicals' Ally?" *Christianity Today* (January 11, 1993), p. 32.
74. Moltmann, *History and the Triune God*, p. 18.
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76. Ibid., p. 85.
77. Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, p. 35.
78. Moltmann, *God in Creation*, p. 78.
79. Ibid., p. 79.
80. Ibid., p. 98.
81. Ibid., p. 78.
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91. Ibid., p. 317.
92. Ibid., p. 312.
93. Ibid., p. 316.
94. Ibid., p. 331.
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96. Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, 1:324-325; Moltmann, *History and the Triune God*, p. xix.
97. Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, p. 1.
98. James Dunn, *Baptism with the Holy Spirit* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970), p. 1.
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100. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 4:30. Cf. Laurence Wood, *Pentecostal Grace* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980), pp. 52-56, for a discussion on Barth's view of the salvific significance of Easter and Pentecost.
101. Ibid., p. 34, 38, 41-46.
102. Ibid., pp. 34-35, 78.
103. Dunn, *Baptism with the Holy Spirit*, pp. 181-182.
104. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 4:40.
105. John Calvin, *Commentary on the Book of Acts* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1949), 2:211.
106. *The Standard Sermons of John Wesley*, ed. Edward H. Sugden (London: Epworth Press, 1961), 2:162-163.

107. For a full text of this conversation, see Moltmann, *The Spirit of Life*, pp. 167-171.
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109. John Fletcher, *Checks to Antinomianism* (New York: Hunt and Eaton, 1889), 2:617.
110. Ted Campbell, *John Wesley and Christian Antiquity*, pp. 66-67.
111. *The Letters of John Wesley*, 6:137; cf. Laurence Wood, *Truly Ourselves, Truly the Spirit's* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989), pp. 202-208.
112. *The Standard Sermons of John Wesley*, 2:157.
113. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 4:1-8.
114. Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, p. 204.
115. Ibid., pp. 208-209.
116. *The Letters of John Wesley*, 6:137.